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Abstract 
This white paper discusses the topic of digital ethics and considers the topic within the background 
of theories on ethics and how they apply within the digital realm.  It explores the issues of internet 
governance, net neutrality, freedom of expression, and privacy and considers how they impact on 
the work of the information profession and wider society. 
Issues around internet governance challenge us from the point of view of net neutrality and  the 
tensions between the original ethos of the Internet pioneers and the enhanced role of governemnts 
ĂŶĚ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌĞŶƚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?  dŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ “ĐŽĚĞ ? ĂƐ ůĂǁ ? ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ďǇ >ĂǁƌĞŶĐĞ
Lessig, is explored in terms of how it challenges ethical behaviour. 
Freedom of expression is a constant challenge as we are presented with calls to limit acess to certain 
information types, and are increasingly charged with considering filtering systems to do so.  The 
increasing emergence of online trolls also challenges freedom of expression rights. 
Privacy is under challenge via both government and corporate interests in our activities and our 
data.  
Overall the need to be aware of fundamental rights versus how those rights may impact on wider 
society is the primary concern around digital ethics. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of ethics relates to how groups of people in society specify and regulate their 
behaviour.  Thus ethics applies to the behavioural norms of entire societies but also to sub-groups 
within society, such as citizens, professions, corporations, governments, religious groups and the 
like.   In this white paper, we discuss digital ethics, which applies considerations of ethical behaviour 
to the realm of information and communications technologies (ICTs). 
1.1. What is digital ethics? 
Digital ethics relates to how human behaviour is managed and specified as it applies to activities in 
the digital realm, including online and through our use of software and other technologies.  It is an 
area of ethical study that is growing in societal importance by the day, as new technologies emerge 
that introduce new challenges to society.   A previous UKeiG white paper explored the topic of the 
Internet of Things which is a recent phenomenon but one that raises ethical issues around how we 
implement these valuable new technologies and the data they produce.  As the paper made clear, 
ƚŚĞ “extent to which this is for the common good will depend on who controls this data, how it is 
used and what safeguards are put in place to protect privacy.
1
  This is a classic question of digital 
ethics and can be applied across the wide range of technologies we use on a daily basis. 
A fundamental paradox of new applications of ICTs is that they aim to make life for human beings 
easier, but at the same time can complicate our lives in ways that are detrimental to us.  As Spinello 
argues with regards to the Internet: 
If it easier to publish and spread truthful and valuable information, it is also easier to spread 
libel, false-hoods, and pornographic material Q And if it is easier to build personal 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐǁŝƚŚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ŝƚ ŝƐĂůƐŽĞĂƐŝĞƌƚŽŵŽŶŝƚŽƌĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂŶĚŝŶǀĂĚĞ
their personal privacy.
2
 
Our discussion in this paper will discuss the ethical issues highlighted by Spinello and more.  We will 
discuss topics such as privacy, freedom of expression and censorship, Internet governance, and how 
all are being impacted within the digital realm.    
1.2. Why does digital ethics matter? 
An understanding of digital ethics is a vital area of knowledge for the information professional.  As 
we are bombarded with solutions that appear to solve problems or challenges in our service 
delivery, we must be aware of the impact those technologies may have on our clients and wider 
society, but also on our own practice.  There are fundamental values that information professionals 
stand to protect, and the reality is that some digital solutions to service delivery may challenge those 
values.  An awareness of the challenges they pose, then, is of crucial importance in our professional 
practice.  As professionals, we have societal responsibilities that go beyond our responsibility to 
employer or client, and we must bear this in mind when implementing any new technologies that 
may potentially harm others. 
2. Ethical theories 
Since many of the issues we will discuss highlight a dichotomy between opposing ethical viewpoints, 
it is important to begin with a short summary of those ethical viewpoints and what they say about 
                                                          
1
 De Saulles, Martin.  The Internet of Things: A UKeiG White Paper.  2016.  p.16.  
http://www.cilip.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/internet_of_things_white_paper_final.pdf  
2
 Spinello, R.A., Cyberethics: Morality and Law in Cyberspace. 6th ed. 2017: Jones & Bartlett Learning. p.ix 
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human behaviour.  Readers wishing a more detailed overview are strongly encouraged to read the 
excellent summary of how ethical theories apply to society provided by Michael Sandel.
3
 
When we discuss ethics we often focus on a specific branch, as we are doing in this white paper by 
discussing digital ethics.  We often see discussions of professional ethics, business ethics, or medical 
ethics, for example.  In reality, all micro discussions around branches of applied ethics, as all of the 
above themes would be classified, stem from the same overarching theories. 
2.1. The main branches of ethical theory 
There are essentially three main branches of ethical theory, complicated by the fact there are 
several subsets within each.  However, an understanding of what the three main branches believe 
provides a good grounding for our discussion of digital ethics.  The three main branches are 
consequentialist ethics, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics.  
2.1.1. Consequentialism 
Consequentialism relates to the potential outcomes of an action and the ethical results of that 
action.  What is important for the consequentialist is that the outcome is satisfactory, not 
necessarily how that outcome has been achieved.   The main consequentialist ethical theory is 
utilitarianism. 
The father of modern utilitarianism was Jeremy Bentham whose theories were developed further by 
John Stuart Mill.  The basic formula for utilitarianism is the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number.  Utilitarianism had a significant effect on political philosophy through the Victorian era and 
well into the late 20
th
 century before it was arguably supplanted by philosophies more focussed 
around individual freedoms. The emergence of major public services, welfare systems, and 
institutions like public libraries and museums can be attributed to the emerging utilitarian thinkers 
of the Victorian era.   
As we have stated, utilitarianism relates to the happiness and well-being of the majority  W therefore 
in a utilitarian world, it is acceptable for some in society to lose out if the happiness of the majority is 
the consequence.  This is an important concept since taken to its extreme it could advocate harm 
being allowed to a small number of people to benefit the majority.   Clearly, this raises significant 
issues of natural justice that have to be addressed by any ethical thinker.  In addition, since 
utilitarianism is focussed on the consequences of an action, the ethics of the motive itself can be 
questioned.   
In terms of digital ethics, we can see utilitarian arguments across many of the areas it is concerned 
with.  For instance, is the monitoring of the online activity of people justifiable if a criminal or 
terrorist is caught and thus harm does not come to others as a result?  A utilitarian might argue that 
the happiness of the majority is the benefit of online surveillance, as the majority is kept safe at the 
expense of a small number wishing to do us harm.  On the other hand, a utilitarian argument could 
be made against online surveillance, since one could argue that the knowledge we are being 
surveilled makes the majority unhappy.  We will explore some of these ideas further later in the 
paper. 
2.1.2. Deontological ethics 
Deontological ethics relate to the concept that there are certain values or actions that are inherently 
good or bad.   Deontological or duty-based, ethics are primarily based on the theories of Immanuel 
Kant, a German 18
th
-century philosopher.  Kant was not convinced by the concept of utilitarianism, 
                                                          
3
 Sandel, Michael.  :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?tŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĞZŝŐŚƚdŚŝŶŐƚŽŽ ?  Penguin.  2009. 
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believing that it ignored a fundamental point in ethics that some actions were by their very nature 
good or bad and that this, not the consequences of the actions, were what is important.   
<ĂŶƚ ?Ɛcategorical imperative is arguably the most important of his theories related to ethics. In his 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, published in 1785, he stated two important maxims that 
underpin his theories.  The first of these maxims states that  “/ŽƵŐŚƚŶĞǀĞƌƚŽĂĐƚĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŶƐƵĐŚĂ
ǁĂǇƚŚĂƚ/ĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽǁŝůůƚŚĂƚŵǇŵĂǆŝŵƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵĞĂƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůůĂǁ ? ?tŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐŽĨƚ-quoted line 
lies the basis of an ethical theory that has been interpreted and re-interpreted to this day.  The basis 
of the imperative is that any action should be morally justifiable by virtue of it being measured 
against it being a potential universal law of nature.  From a normative standpoint, it essentially 
means that actions that are unjustifiable to a reasonable person are morally unjustifiable.  For 
instance, we would not wish theft or murder to become universal laws of nature, therefore under 
<ĂŶƚ ?ƐŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶĞǀĞƌũƵƐƚifiable.  Conversely for the consequentialist they can 
be if the outcome aids utility. 
<ĂŶƚ ?ƐĨŝŶĂůŵĂǆŝŵƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨŚŽǁǁĞƵƐĞŽƚŚĞƌŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐ ?,ĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ “Act in such 
a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never 
ŵĞƌĞůǇĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐƚŽĂŶĞŶĚ ?ďƵƚĂůǁĂǇƐĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞĂƐĂŶĞŶĚ ? ? hƐŝŶŐĂŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐĂƐĂ
means relates to using them to further your own interests, and not thinking of their interests.  
Treating them as an end, on the other hand, means considering their interests in any dealings you 
may have with them.  This essentially means respecting their freedoms to make decisions and to act 
in their own interests.    This part of the categorical imperative is the basis of many of the rights-
based philosophies that currently exist. 
Deontological ethics apply in the digital realm also.  For instance, a deontologist would likely 
consider the rights of individuals to be more important than the societal impact of an activity.  This 
right to privacy and freedom of expression may be something that a deontologist would guard with 
care.  The issue for a deontologist becomes whose rights should take priority in certain situations. 
2.1.2. Virtue ethics 
Virtue ethics has its origins in the classical philosophy of Aristotle.  A major consideration in classical 
mythology was what the virtuous life would actually be, and this informed the concept of living the 
good life and being a good person.  At the heart of the concept was eudaimonia or happiness. The 
concept of virtue is that it is a mean between excess, on one hand, and deficiency on the other.  
Importantly, however, it is not about moral absolutes such as anger or pleasure being always 
automatically right or wrong. 
Virtue ethics is arguably of less practical application than either deontological or consequentialist 
ethics.  Since its focus is on the subjective human condition, it is more difficult to apply its theories to 
discussions of digital ethics.   However, as we are seeing increasing calls to the importance of good 
character in human agents, it seems that virtue ethics are making something of a comeback and are 
worth being aware of from that standpoint.   
3. Internet governance 
A vital aspect of digital ethics relates to how the Internet itself is governed.   The success of the 
Internet has been unprecedented in human history.  In December 1995 the Internet had 16 million 
users, and by 2016 the estimate for users was 3.4 billion across the globe.  Yet arguably with its 
explosion in usage and impact the original goals of the medium have been under pressure.    
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3.1. The Internet manifesto 
In 1996 the manifesto that overarched the early days of the Internet was published by John Perry 
Barlow.  You can read the full text via the link below, but some snippets reveal how the early 
Internet pioneers saw the medium: 
 “'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů tŽƌůĚ ? ǇŽƵ ǁĞĂƌǇ ŐŝĂŶƚƐ ŽĨůĞƐŚ ĂŶĚ ƐƚĞĞů ? / ĐŽŵĞ ĨƌŽŵ
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us 
alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇǁŚĞƌĞǁĞŐĂƚŚĞƌ ? ?4 
Importantly the manifesto sought to demarcate the Internet as a new medium that would not be 
ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŵŽƌĞƐĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?  ƐĂƌůŽǁĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ ?  “You do not know our 
culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be 
ŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚďǇĂŶǇŽĨǇŽƵƌŝŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƌƵĐŝĂůůǇĂƌůŽǁŝƐ ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚŝƐĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĞǁ
ethical domain.   In terms of digital ethics, the Internet manifesto is of vital importance in 
understanding the original mission of the medium. 
Whether such grand notions for the medium were ever truly real, there was certainly a feeling 
among early adopters and those who shaped the Internet that this was an entirely new paradigm 
shift in humanity, and one that would be free of governmental and commercial influences.  As Lessig 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?  “dŚĞĐůĂŝŵĨŽƌĐǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞǁĂƐŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚƚŚĂƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĐǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞ ? it 
was that government coƵůĚŶŽƚƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĐǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞ ? ?5 
3.1.1. The Internet infrastructure 
The Internet is governed in a multi-structured way, with several organisations responsible for 
separate aspects of its operations.  These groups include the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), as well as the Internet Society (ISOC).  The mission and 
mandate of the Internet Society are focused on the education, empowerment and awareness of 
governments, businesses and the users around the world.   The ecosystem of the Internet provides a 
unique governance structure of a type that was originally designed to make the medium as 
participative and open as is possible.   
Timothy Garton Ash highlights that what was essentially the pragmatism of building a network that 
could still ensure communication after a nuclear war, was also partly inspired by grander notions of 
openness and cooperation: 
&Žƌ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ŽŶĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ĨŽƌ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ? ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ
packets could reach their destinations via multiple alternative routes, was to increase the 
chances of information still getting through after a first nuclear strike. But their American 
libertarian convictions also fed into this notion of free passage irrespective of content: you 
ƉĂƐƐŵǇƉĂĐŬĞƚƐ ?/ ?ůůƉĂƐƐǇŽƵƌƐ ?>ĂƚĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĞƌƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨ
 ‘ŶĞƚ ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐ ĂŶǇ ĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶon grounds of the content of the packet, the 
identity of its sender or the application used. 
6
 
We will discuss net neutrality further below. 
                                                          
4
 Barlow, J.P. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. 1996. https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-
independence  
5
 Lessig, L. Code version 2.0.  Basic Books. p.3.  http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf  
6
 Ash, Timothy Garton. Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World. Atlantic Books. Kindle Edition.  
(Kindle Location 465). 
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3.2. Governance concerns 
Cerf et al have observed that despite the desire of many that the Internet remains an open and 
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ “ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞůĂƐƚƐĞǀĞƌĂůǇĞĂƌƐŵŽƌĞĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐŚĂǀĞ
ďĞĞŶƚĂŬŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚŚĞĨůŽǁŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ ?7  This focus on the influence 
of governments and companies forms a significant tranche of the concerns over what has been 
called, Internet fragmentation.  
In his testimony on the future of the web to the US House of Representatives, Tim Berners-Lee 
identified three Internet concepts that he argued were crucial to the foundation of the web:     
1. Universal linking 
2. An open foundation for information-driven innovation 
3. Separation of layers  
8
 
Hill mirrors this analysis more broadly and argues that: 
ĞĂƌůǇ /ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ ĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌƐ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ ?Ɛ ĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ďĞůŝĞĨ ƚŚĂƚ
connecting people together and enabling them openly to share ideas was an objective that 
should be encouraged; consistent with that objective, the early designers insisted that 
governments should have a very limited role in regulating the Internet. 
9
 
These ideas are potentially under challenge as the Internet evolves, with arguments that both the 
openness and the freedom from government intervention of the ideal Internet experience are under 
threat.     Although Berners-Lee was talking specifically about the world wide web, as one would 
expect given his role in its evolution, he is clear that the values that underpin the Internet made the 
web a reality.    
3.2.1. Net neutrality 
Net neutrality is an important concept in terms of digital ethics.  The idea underpins much of what 
the Internet has become in terms of being a domain that contains a wide range of traffic that is 
efficiently distributed without fear or favour.  Spinello defines net neutrality as such: 
All ISPs and telecom companies are required to treat every form of data equally, in a way 
that is consistent with the end-to-end design principle.  They cannot discriminate between 
different packets of data.  This means they cannot enhance the performance of some 
ƐƚƌĞĂŵƐ ŽĨ ĚĂƚĂ ƚŽ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ Ă  “ĨĂƐƚ ůĂŶĞ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĂƚ ĚĂƚĂ ? ŶŽƌ ĐĂŶ ƚŚĞǇĞŵƉůŽǇ  “ƚŽůůƐ ? Žƌ ĂŶǇ
means that slows down the transmission of Internet packets.
10
 
Net neutrality is of vital importance in terms of keeping the Internet running smoothly.  As French 
notes, while the Internet has evolved into bandwidth-hungry services that rely on quick and efficient 
packet switching to ensure the service is provided (i.e. online gambling, Skyping, video streaming), 
the Internet was not originally designed for this, nor was net neutrality as a concept built around the 
reality of an Internet that offered such services.  Therefore the infrastructure has had to deal with 
                                                          
7
 ĞƌĨ ?s ? ?W ?ZǇĂŶ ?ĂŶĚD ?^ĞŶŐĞƐ ? “/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ/ƐKƵƌ^ŚĂƌĞĚZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?. I/S: A Journal of Law 
and Policy for the Information Society, 2014. 10: p.1. 
8
 Berners-Lee, T. The Future of the Web. Testimony of Sir Timothy Berners-Lee Before the United States House 
of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the 
Internet.  http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2007/03/01-ushouse-future-of-the-web.html  
9
 Hill, J.F., Internet Fragmentation: Highlighting the Major Technical, Governance and Diplomatic Challenges for 
U.S. Policy Makers. 2012: Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School.  p.15. 
10
 Spinello, R.A., Cyberethics: Morality and Law in Cyberspace. 6th ed. 2017: Jones & Bartlett Learning. p.38. 
 Digital Ethics - David McMenemy 
 
 8  UKeiG White Paper 
 
highly increased capacity and had to undergo essential and expensive improvements in bandwidth 
capability. 
11
 
Linked to this is the emergence of telecommunication companies as content providers, something 
that was not the case when the Internet was designed.  Companies whose previous roles were 
limited to the telecommunications infrastructure and ensuring Internet traffic passed unhindered 
began to merge with other companies involved in content creation, and thus began to have interests 
in ensuring their content, or their customers, were privileged.  One solution is to more heavily 
regulate how ISPs offer their services, ensuring they commit to providing a steady service for all.  The 
concerns expressed by those who advocate tighter regulation are highlighted by McCartney, namely 
ƚŚĞ ĨĞĂƌƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ďƌŽĂĚďĂŶĚ ƉƌŽǀiders, such as AT&T and Comcast, will use their market 
power in consumer markets unfairly, favouring Internet content in which they have a financial 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?12   
French argues that essentially three concepts underpin the net neutrality debate, namely freedom of 
expression, consumer protection, and innovation and economic growth. 
13
  Freedom of expression is 
limited if ISPs are able to throttle content from a service they do not favour.  While the intention 
may not be to censor, the favouring is strictly business, the end result is that legitimate content is 
not seen by Internet users.  A recent example of this was highlighted on BBC News where T-Mobile 
was argued to be favouring its own video streaming service, Binge On, across its US network while 
throttling content from providers such as YouTube. 
14
  The Binge On service provided content from T 
DŽďŝůĞ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌEĞƚĨůŝǆĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ? 
dŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŽĨ &ƌĞŶĐŚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ŽĨ ǀŝƚĂů ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?  tŚĞŶ Ă
consumer signs up for an ISP account, they are reliant on the service that the ISP provides.  They 
have little way of knowing unless they are informed netizens aware of issues such as net neutrality, 
whether the reason they cannot access a service is because the service provider is poor, or the ISP is 
merely throttling bandwidth.  Given it is unlikely that a consumer would be able to cite throttling as 
a reason for getting out of an ISP contract, we have an added element of concern re consumer 
protection.    
Lastly, innovation and economic growth are stifled if ISPs are allowed to favour content from one 
provider over another.  The investment a company may put into providing an excellent service may 
well be wasted if consumers cannot access it efficiently.  If the reason they cannot do so is, again, 
throttling of content, then a company is having its commercial interests restricted by another with 
vested interests.  This not only goes against the values of the Internet, it is also arguably anti-
business generally, and risks stifling innovation and creating monopolies.  We can see then that net 
neutrality does indeed raise important ethical issues with regards Internet fragmentation that we 
must be aware of. 
3.3. Code is law 
An important concept around Internet governance and digital ethics is the idea proposed by 
Lawrence Lessig that code is law.   A unique aspect of the Internet medium was that it was a system 
designed around computer code and systems architecture.  This meant that those very things could 
be used to govern interactions with the system.  Every act performed on the Internet involves the 
use of code and a systems architecture to achieve the desired result, and that meant those 
                                                          
11
 &ƌĞŶĐŚ ?Z ? ? ? “EĞƚEĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ?University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal, 2007. 4(1 & 2).  p.115 
12
 DĐĂƌƚŶĞǇ ? ? ? “>ĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞKƉĞŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ ? ?Federal Communications Law Journal, 2011-2012. 64(3).  p.494 
13
 French. Op. cit.  p.116 
14 ^ĞĞ “T-DŽďŝůĞ ?ďƌĞĂŬƐ ?ŶĞƚŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇƌƵůĞƐǁŝƚŚďŝŶŐĞŽŶ ? ? http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
35232288  
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technologies could be used to control the experience.   This clearly gives those writing the code and 
designing and managing the infrastructure, immense power to shape the Internet experience.  Lessig 
argues that: 
 “ƚŚĞŝŶǀŝƐŝďůĞŚĂŶĚŽĨĐǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞŝƐďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂŶĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚŝƐƋƵŝƚĞƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞŽĨŝƚƐ
architecture at its birth. This invisible hand, pushed by government and by commerce, is 
constructing an architecture that will perfect control and make highly efficient regulation 
possible. The struggle in that world will not be governments. It will be to assure that 
essential liberty are preserved in this environment of perfect control. 
15
 
In terms of code ďĞŝŶŐ ůĂǁ ? >ĞƐƐŝŐ ĐůĂƌŝĨŝĞƐ ŚŝƐ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĂƚ ŝĚĞĂ P  “/Ŷ
ĐǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞǁĞŵƵƐƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŚŽǁĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ “ĐŽĚĞ ?ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞƐ ?  how the software and hardware 
 ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?ƚŚĞ “ĐŽĚĞ ?ŽĨĐǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŵĂŬĞĐǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ ?ĂůƐŽƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĐǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞĂƐŝƚŝƐ ? ?16   
The ethical implications of this are clear, and as ĞEĂƌĚŝƐ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐ ?  “dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ŽĨ /ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ
governance increasingly mediate civil liberties such as freedom of expression and individual 
ƉƌŝǀĂĐǇ ? ?17  The implications of this will be discussed below when we consider both topics in more 
detail. 
>ĞƐƐŝŐ ?ƐĨƵůůƚŚĞƐŝƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚǁŚĂƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĨŽƵƌŵŽĚĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ P 
1. Law: these are the laws created by governments and other regulatory bodies that govern 
conduct on the Internet.  This mirrors the real world where law governs all. 
2. Norms: this relates to the behaviours and the etiquette of the Internet.  Norms regulate 
behaviour because communities in the digital realm specify behaviours they will tolerate and 
those they will not.   
3. Markets: companies provide services that Internet users consume, and the provision of the 
service also acts as a form of regulation.   
4. Code: as we have seen Lessing believes it is the code written by those who build the 
architecture and services we access on the Internet who are the ultimate regulators.  In code 
being law, all transactions and experiences are subject to regulation by the inbuilt system 
delivering them.  Passwords for website access, filtering systems for limiting certain types of 
information, and the like. 
tĞǁŝůůƐĞĞ>ĞƐƐŝŐ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇĐŽŵŝŶŐƵƉĂŐĂŝŶŝŶƐĞǀĞƌĂůĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂƌĞĂƐŽĨŽƵƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐďĞůŽǁ ? 
4. Freedom of expression and censoring content 
Providing access to a wide range of information sources is a sine qua non of the information 
profession.  This entails a commitment to and understanding of the debates around freedom of 
expression.  Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
The idea is also included in Article 10 of the Human Rights Act in the UK. Therefore the notion that 
access to information should be restricted, clashes with a fundamental core belief in the modern 
age, and is something that challenges the ethical parameters of information work.   Yet there are 
                                                          
15
 Ibid p.4. 
16
 Ibid p.5. 
17
 DeNardis, Laura. The Global War for Internet Governance.  2014. Yale University Press.  p.1. 
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legitimate grounds for rĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŶŐĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƐŽŵĞŬŝŶĚƐŽĨ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ P “ƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵƐŽĨĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?
ůŝŬĞƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ǀĞŶŽŵŽƵƐŚĂƚĞƐƉĞĞĐŚ ?ŽƌƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ ?ĂƌĞŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ? ? 18 
/ŶƚŚĞĂƌĞŶĂŽĨĚŝŐŝƚĂůĞƚŚŝĐƐ>ĞƐƐŝŐ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĐŽĚĞĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĂĐĐĞƐƐŝƐĂŐĂŝŶǀĂlid 
here, since, with a system built on code, information can be easily blocked or restricted based on 
parameters set within the code. This ability is also evident from the point of view of countries being 
able to apply their own content controls over Internet traffic, which is something that fundamentally 
goes against the thesis of the Internet pioneers who sought a global medium where governments 
could not interfere.  
As we will find, we can also see this in Internet filtering systems on a daily basis, for instance within 
public services offering Internet access such as public libraries and schools, where Internet filters on 
local servers are often utilised to restrict access to information deemed to be inappropriate.  As 
^ƉŝŶĞůůŽŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?  “ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞŽĨ free speech and content controls in cyberspace has emerged as 
ĂƌŐƵĂďůǇƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐŵŽƌĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƐĐĞŶƚ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŐĞ ? ?19  An overview of 
the arguments around freedom of expression should provide some context.   
4.1. Arguments for and against freedom of expression 
The notion of freedom of expression encompasses several important ideas: forming opinions, 
expressing opinions, and being able to access the information that helps make you informed are 
inherently related concepts.  Immediately then we can also see a direct link to the notion of privacy; 
privacy allows the freedom for an individual to access information out of the gaze of others and form 
opinions.   
The arguments that are posited for defending and protecting free speech are usually presented as a 
counter to those who may wish to restrict it for various reasons.  The philosophy of free speech 
could be an entire volume in itself, therefore to neatly summarise the arguments we will focus on 
and discuss the categorisation put forward in the authoritative summary of the topic in ĂƌĞŶĚƚ ?Ɛ 
peerless text on the subject.    Barendt defines some core defences that are often used to justify the 
protection of free speech, and these can be summarised as: 
x Argument from truth 
x Argument from autonomy 
x Argument from democracy 20 
 
The argument from truth is largely associated with the approach to issues of individual freedom 
posited by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, although as Barendt observes we can trace similar 
sentiments in the defences provided much earlier by Milton in Areopagitica, and latterly by Judge 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in the famous Abrams vs. US 250 US 616 case.  Another over-arching term 
applied to the concept of the argument from truth is that of a marketplace of ideas, referencing the 
notion that people should be presented with the broadest possible range of ideas to select their 
ƚƌƵƚŚ ?Žƌ ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ P “ǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚĚĞŶǇĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇƚŽĂŶǇĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŽƉŝŶŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐ
the efficiĞŶĐǇŽĨƚŚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?21   
As Campbell has also suggested, the argument from truth could be classified as a justification for 
freedom of speech that is based on a consequentialist rather than a rights-based point of view.  In 
other words, truth matters to society because it ultimately benefits the majority of people by 
                                                          
18
 Spinello.  Op. cit.  p.67 
19
 Ibid  p.67 
20
 Barendt, E. Freedom of Speech. 2
nd
 Edition. 2006. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
21
 Campbell, T. Rights: A Critical Introduction. 2006. London And New York: Routledge. p.143. 
 Digital Ethics - David McMenemy 
 
 11  UKeiG White Paper 
 
ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ Ă ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚƌƵƚŚ ďĞŝŶŐ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇ ĂďŽƵƚ ĂŶǇŽŶĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĞĐŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚĞŶĚĂƐĂƌĞŶĚƚĚŽĞƐƚŚĂƚ ƚƌƵƚŚĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽďĞ  “ĂŶautonomous 
ĂŶĚĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŐŽŽĚ ?ŝŶĂŶĚŽĨŝƚƐĞůĨ ?22  &ŽƌDŝůůƚƌƵƚŚǁĂƐ “ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚďĞůŝĞĨ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
was only valid when an idea or viewpoint has been thoroughly tested and critiqued within society 
through argument and debate.    As Campbell ƐƵŵŵĂƌŝƐĞƐǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽDŝůů ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŽƐƵƉƉƌĞƐƐ
ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽŶĂƚŽƉŝĐ “ŝƐƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŽĨĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ
ŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽĨŚĞĂƌŝŶŐĂŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĨĂůƐĞ ? ?23  Therefore, the argument goes that we should not 
exclude any perspectives because we cannot be certain whether a viewpoint that is being expressed 
bears some truth to it that can challenge an orthodoxy and make proponents for it justify the truth 
of that view in the public sphere.   By this token, we should also not suppress false views we know to 
be false, as the expression of a falsehood may also have value since it entails the speaker of a truth 
justifying their truth in the face of said falsehood.  As Mill states ?ŶŽŽŶĞŚĂƐ “ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞƚŚĞ
quesƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĂůůŵĂŶŬŝŶĚ ?ĂŶĚĞǆĐůƵĚĞĞǀĞƌǇŽƚŚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐŽĨũƵĚŐŝŶŐ ? ?24   
The argument from autonomy is based on the concept that freedom of expression is a fundamental 
right for individuals if they are to achieve their potential as rational persons.  It is one of the most 
overt justifications of free speech from a liberal standpoint since it is entirely focussed on the rights 
ŽĨ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĂŶǇ ƐŽĐŝĞƚĂů ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂǇ ĂĐĐƌƵĞ P ŝƚ  “ŝƐan intrinsic, not an 
ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůƌŝŐŚƚ Q/ƚǀĂůƵĞƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĨŽƌŝƚƐŽǁŶƐĂŬĞ ?ŶŽƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚƌĞƐƵůƚƐƚŚĂƚĨůŽǁĨƌŽŵŝƚ ? ?25 
By the same token, however, it could be seen to be antithetical to consequentialist arguments for 
free speech, since no consideration is given to the impact of free speech on wider society under this 
justification.    
ƐĂƌĞŶĚƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ?  “ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶǁŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽƐĂǇĂŶĚǁƌŝƚĞ ?Žƌ QƚŽŚĞĂƌĂŶĚƌĞĂĚ ?
ŝŶŚŝďŝƚŽƵƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚŝƚƐŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? ?26   Under this justification, we can also see links between it 
ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞŽƚŚĞƌĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ “ƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŽĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?27   As he also notes, however, the argument from autonomy also veers into territory 
that can see a clash between ŽŶĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐƚŚĞŝƌĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨƐƉĞĞĐŚ ?ǀĞƌƐƵƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
right not to be insulted or defamed.  The contemporary problem of online trolling and harassment is 
an example of the challenges inherent in the argument from autonomy, as we will see below. 
ĂŵƉďĞůů ŽĨĨĞƌƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ĨƌŽŵ ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ŝƐ  “ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ƐĐŽƉĞ ? ĨŽƌ ŝƚ ĐĂŶ ƚĂŬĞ ŝŶ Ăůů
forms and types of speech, and it is powerful in its foundations, for it finds its justification in the 
ĨůŽƵƌŝƐŚŝŶŐŽĨĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞůǇŚƵŵĂŶĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?28  
The argument from democracy ƌĞůĂƚĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ  “ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ŽĨ ƐƉĞĞĐŚ ŝƐ Ă ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
ingredient of the accountability on which the benefits of democracy are posited ? ?29  This defence 
focuses on the importance of a free flow of information and viewpoints within a democracy, 
allowing citizens to be informed and able to hold their elected representatives and the institutions 
that they manage on our behalf to account.  This defence also not only bestows rights to free speech 
on citizens, it also often focuses on the importance of rights to freedom of information from the 
point of view of government documents, and many countries have legislated for such rights.   In 
                                                          
22
 Barendt.  Op. cit.  p.7 
23
 Campbell.  Op. cit.  p.143 
24
 Mill, J.S. On Liberty.  London: Walter Scott Publishing Ltd.  1869.  pp.11-12. 
25
 Campbell.  Op. cit. p.147. 
26
 Barendt.  Op. cit.  p.13. 
27
 Ibid.  p.7. 
28
 Campbell.  Op. cit  p.147. 
29
 Ibid. p.145. 
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other words, a citizen would have the right to exercise their freedom of speech in asking from the 
government and getting the information they wish to see to hold them to account. 
There are again some key criticisms that can be levelled at this defence: if the focus is primarily on 
democracy and the institutions and people who are a part of it, free speech could be argued to be 
defined in a very narrow sense.  Unlike other defences which focus on the totality of human 
experience, the argument from democracy would be in danger of focussing only on speech that 
supported political decision-making at the expense of artistic, or spiritual expression.  As a 
consequentialist defence of the right, a plausible scenario could be posited that any speech act that 
ŚĂƌŵĞĚ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŵĂĚĞ ŝůůĞŐĂů ?  dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ŝƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĚĞĞŵĞĚ ǁƌŽŶŐ  “ƚŽ ƚŽůĞƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ
ciƌĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĂĚǀŽĐĂƚŝŶŐŝƚƐŽǀĞƌƚŚƌŽǁ ? ?30    ^ĐŚĂƵĞƌŐŽĞƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ P “ƚŚĞǀĞƌǇ
notion of popular sovereignty supporting the argument from democracy argues against any 
limitation on that sovereignty, and thereby argues against recognition of an independent principle of 
ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ŽĨ ƐƉĞĞĐŚ ? ?31 Ɛ ĂŵƉďĞůů ƐƵŵŵĂƌŝƐĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ĨƌŽŵ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ  “ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ƐŽŵĞ
powerful rationales for increased and different types of freedom of speech, but only within the 
domain of political assessment and ĚĞďĂƚĞ ? ?32 
4.1.1. Free speech restrictions 
Challenges to free speech can be identified in several areas.  Firstly, we can identify concerns that 
relate to the dignity of groups, on one hand, whereby hate speech attacks their sense of worth and 
identity and even possibly places them in physical harm.  A second area of concern exists from the 
point of view of group rights and free speech, largely distilled from a critical feminist perspective, 
and related to the notion that some voices represent viewpoints that are already over-represented 
in the public sphere, and therefore more space should be made for voices deemed to be marginal.  
In this context there is the belief that the privilege of some groups means there is often a case for 
restricting their access to the public sphere, and therefore by implication their right to speak.  In 
some modern contexts, especially academic settings in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom under the epithets of no-platforming, and safe spaces, we see a combination of these two 
stances combining for effect, and controversy. 
At the heart of the debate around hate speech lies the thorny issue of actual harm that can come 
about as a result of speech acts.  For Mill, there was a distinct difference between speech that 
targeted a group in a general sense, and speech designed to stir up physical harm to someone.  In an 
oft-quoted passage from On Liberty he states: 
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, 
ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur 
punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-
dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. 
33
 
In the argument from truth, then, there is space for severe speech that challenges individuals, but 
only when that speech leads to actual harm should it be punished or restricted.  This notion forms 
ƉĂƌƚŽĨDŝůů ?ƐǁŝĚĞůǇ-cited harm principle.    
To this end, Post delineates how legislative frameworks have interpreted hate speech from the point 
of view of passing laws against it.   He highlights the fact that in a modern democracy, mere 
disagreement with an opinion is not enough to constitute a hate crime: thus objecting to a religious 
                                                          
30
 Barendt.  Op. cit. p.19. 
31
 Schauer, F. (1982) Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.41. 
32
 Campbell.  Op. cit. p.145. 
33
 Mill.  Op. cit.  p.39. 
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doctrine and stating that opinion should not be enough to constitute hate speech.  He identifies that 
hate crime normally will only be defined when a speech act expressing abhorrence or dislike is 
ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĞůĞŵĞŶƚ  “ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ the unique presence of extreme hate 
ĂŶĚŚĞŶĐĞƚŽũƵƐƚŝĨǇůĞŐĂůŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?34 These elements are usually: 
1. The manner of the speech act 
2. The likelihood of it causing contingent harm, violence or discrimination  
In the first category Post explains that the manner of the speech act relates essentially to the style of 
it; in that vein, ŝƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĂĐƚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞ “ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚŝŶƐƵĐŚĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚŝŶƐƵůƚƐ ?ŽĨĨĞŶĚƐ ?Žƌ
ĚĞŐƌĂĚĞƐ ? ?35  He acknowledges the difficulty, however, of ascertaining this, and suggests that 
 “ĂŵďŝĞŶƚƐŽĐŝĞƚĂůŶŽƌŵƐ ?ŶĞĞĚƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞcategorisation.  
4.2. Free expression and the digital realm 
While the technologies used to facilitate free expression may change with each generation, the 
concerns of unfettered free expression and its impact on society remain the same as those 
summarised above.  What limits should be placed on free expression, and what justifications can be 
made, if any, have become a major controversy in the digital realm.   Two important issues are of 
immediate concern: filtering of Internet content, and offensive behaviour online. 
4.2.1. Filtering of content and managing access to the Internet 
Internet filtering is a software-driven process of excluding websites from being able to be accessed is 
used by many organisations to prevent users from accessing specific categories of website.  The 
process is normally driven by the blocking of words or phrases within the text of a webpage, or via a 
web address which is on a list of banned sites, or a combination of both.   More specifically the two 
main types of filter have been defined as stand-alone systems or protocol-based systems: 
x In a stand-alone system, the filtering software vendors pre-designate which content will be 
filtered, and the user does not have control. 
x Protocol-based systems, on the other hand, do not determine in advance which content will 
be blocked. Rather, protocol-based systems can locate information on the Internet and, 
based on established standards interpret the information to determine whether a particular 
page should be blocked. 
36
 
While the organisation installing filtering will have some control over the blocking parameters 
through the initial specification supplied to the vendor, and the administrative settings provided, it 
remains a fact that the initial design of what the filtering system will block is largely specified by the 
software creators.  
/ƚŝƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇƚƌƵĞƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐ,ĂƵƉƚŵĂŶƉƵƚƐŝƚ ? “ƵŶĨŝůƚĞƌĞĚĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌnet presents some major 
ĞƚŚŝĐĂů ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ĞǀĞŶ ƚŽ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽƐĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ŝƐ ƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂů ? ?
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ŝƚ ŝƐ ĞƋƵĂůůǇ ƚƌƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ?  “ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŽƵƌ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ƚŽŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƵƐĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ǀŝƌƚƵĂů
ǁŽƌůĚ ? ?37   Yet undoubtedly there are occasions when this must be considered. 
In terms of digital services, filtering of internet content in publically-funded libraries is ubiquitous in 
the United Kingdom.  The MAIPLE project found that 100% of the respondents to their survey (80 
                                                          
34
 WŽƐƚ ?Z ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “,ĂƚĞ^ƉĞĞĐŚ ?In.  Hare, I. And Weinstein, J. (Eds) (2009) Extreme Speech and Democracy.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  p.127. 
35
 Ibid. p.127 
36
 Sobel, D.L. (2003).  Internet filters and public libraries.  First Reports.  4 (2). p.5. 
37
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library authorities) filtered internet content, 
38
 while a study conducted by Scottish public library 
services found that 31 of the 32 authorities filtered content. 
39
   Such filtering has ethical parameters, 
and there is no public audit of the content that is filtered.  Since the process is software-driven, 
legitimate content can be blocked, and while both of the studies cited above found that some library 
authorities provided the ability to unblock legitimate sites that are blocked, there remains an issue 
of equity of access.   In the MAIPLE study, it was found that 75% of respondents working for public 
library services found filtering to be either very useful or somewhat useful. 
40
  Research earlier this 
year by the Radical Librarians collective revealed that many public library services have installed off 
the shelf systems that apply categories of blocking to information which differed between each 
ĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?ĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ “ďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ? ? “>'d ? ? ?ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞůŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞƐ ? ? “ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ ? ?
 “ƚĂƐƚĞůĞƐƐ ? ? “ƉĂǇĚĂǇůŽĂŶƐ ? ? “ĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? “ƐĞůĨ-ŚĞůƉ ?ĂŶĚ “ƐĞǆĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? 41   
The rationale for filtering is clear from a specific ethical standpoint; it is about the prevention of 
ĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐĚĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞ  “ŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ? ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚǇƉĞƐŽĨƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ŽƌŽƚŚer 
materials that be inappropriate for a specific age group or deemed excessively offensive.   Yet the 
basis of Internet filtering is the antithesis of free and open access.  This becomes even more of a 
concern when we consider the nature of the legitimate material blocked, such as material on sexual 
health, breast cancer, or sexuality, or lifestyle as evidenced above.   
Consider how many users may be too embarrassed to ask a teacher or librarian about issues like 
sexuality, indeed this may be the primary reason why they have chosen the Internet as their 
information source as it offers relative anonymity and privacy.  Being confronted with a screen 
blocking access to information is unlikely to have such a user politely chatting to the person in 
charge to have their information provided, regardless of their approachability. It could be argued 
that many organisations ventured down the filtering route to protect them rather than in a bid to 
halt intellectual freedom, but this makes the decision even more problematic for an ethical 
professional.  The problem with filtering, as discussed above, is that while it may block material that 
is offensive or questionable (though the question remains to whom), it has also been found to block 
material of a legitimate nature, and often this material is of personal or sensitive importance to a 
user.    
It could be argued that it is the clumsiness of filtering software that poses the largest ethical 
concern.  Taking the human out of assessing information for a user is always a bad thing, but to put 
it in the hands of a software program is clumsy in the extreme.  Code may well be law, but code does 
not understand nuance or subtlety.   Code is also not able to understand the urgency or importance, 
or sensitivity of a piece of information to the person seeking it.  
In reality, organisations may be required to manage access to their networks and the content 
accessed on it for several crucial reasons.  Firstly, the accountability of the organisation needs to be 
considered, as providing access to users will be for a purpose, be it a public access issue, or access 
for an employee to undertake the business of the organisation.  The user of the system is 
accountable to the organisation, and the organisation is liable to its funders, shareholders or board 
members.   
                                                          
38
 Spacey, R., Cooke, L., Creaser, C. and Muir, A., 2015. Regulating Internet access and content in UK public 
libraries: Findings from the MAIPLE project. Journal of Librarianship and Information Science. 47 (1).  pp.71-
84. 
39
 ƌŽǁŶ ?' ?ĂŶĚDĐDĞŶĞŵǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “dhe implementation of internet filtering in Scottish public libraries", 
Aslib Proceedings. 65 (2) pp.182-202. 
40
 Spacey et al.  Op. cit.  
41 Payne, D. New research maps the extent of web filtering in public libraries. 2016.  
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As well as content filtering, developing acceptable use policies (AUPs) that each user would have to 
agree to before being given Internet access has been a key tool to use. As a general rule, acceptable 
use policies (AUPs) should include the following considerations: 
1. Informing users of their responsibilities;  
a. these include both legal requirements and those defined by the organisation 
2. Providing the organisation with legal protection from liability;  
a. it should be made clear to users that the organisation is not responsible for their 
actions on-line with regard to e-commerce and possible fraud by third parties 
resulting in losses to the user  W for example, all on-ůŝŶĞƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĂƚƚŚĞƵƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
ƌŝƐŬ ?ĂŶĚĂƌĞŶŽƚƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ 
3. Defining a contract between the organisation and the user;  
a. the policy should define the limits of the service, setting out what services are 
available and what would lead to those services being withdrawn.  
The format of an AUP is normally a written document that is presented to a user when they are 
either requesting access to the network or are being provided with their login details to do so.  Other 
ways of presenting an AUP to users include Log-in Banners, which are agreements presented to a 
user on the screen of their computer as they seek access.  An acknowledgement button normally has 
to be clicked by the user to confirm that a set of terms have been agreed to by them. 
Ethical issues around AUPs are also important to consider.  Does the user understand the nature of 
the document they are signing for?  Since the document constitutes a contract between the user 
and the information organisation, it is important that policies are as understandable as possible. 
42
  
4.2.2. Freedom of expression online 
One of the current concerns of our time relates to what have been dubbed Internet trolls.  These are 
individuals who disrupt online communications or who use social media to harass others, or  ?who 
posts inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic messages in an online community, such as a forum, chat 
room, or blog, with the primary intent of provoking readers into an emotional response or of 
otherwise disrupting normal on-topic discussion. ?43  While traditional online trolling pre-social media 
may have been aimed at individuals on message boards, special media services like Twitter allow 
public figures with accounts on the services to become potential targets for the activity. 
Ɛ^ƉŝŶĞůůŽŚĂƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?  “ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞĂŶĚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞĂůůƚŽŽĐŽŵŵŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
ŝŶĨŽƐƉŚĞƌĞ ĂŶĚ ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ŝŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝǀĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŵĞĚŝĂ ? ?44   Even in a country like the USA, with a 
history of free expression as guaranteed though the First Amendment, behaviour that is threatening 
towards another crosses a line when it comes to freedom of speech.  This could be defined as harm 
ƵŶĚĞƌDŝůů ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? 
The UK authorities are clearly concerned about what they see as a growing public menace.  As Hume 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵƐ ƵƐ ?  “'ƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ŝƐƐƵĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ h< ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ŽĨ WƵďůŝĐ WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ŵĂŬĞ
clear that somebody should face prosecution if they post  W or repost  W ĂŵĞƐƐĂŐĞŽŶůŝŶĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐůĞĂƌůǇ
                                                          
42
 'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ? ? ?DĐDĞŶĞŵǇ ? ?ĂŶĚWŽƵůƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƵƐĞŽĨĐŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ
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ĂŵŽƵŶƚƐƚŽĂĐƌĞĚŝďůĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? 45   dŚĞƐĂŵĞŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƚŚĂƚ “ŽŶůŝŶĞ
ƉŽƐƚƐĚĞĞŵĞĚ ‘ŐƌŽƐƐůǇŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ?ŝŶĚĞĐĞŶƚ ?ŽďƐĐĞŶĞŽƌĨĂůƐĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞŵƵĐŚŚĂƌĚĞƌƚŽƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞ ? ?46 
High-profile figures being forced off social media due to harassment seem an ever-present item in 
the news, but the experiences of US actress Leslie Jones who was racially abused on Twitter highlight 
how offensive and personal the trolls can be when let loose. 
47
  The harassment of female UK 
Members of Parliament such as Stella Creasy has seen trolls convicted and imprisoned, yet the 
behaviour still occurs. 
48
   
A large ethical question around online trolling and harassment is how much responsibility social 
media services themselves should have.   Stella Creasy, herself a target of online trolls as cited 
above, suggests that both the police and the Internet companies need to do more to combat the 
situation. For Creasy, ƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨŽŶůŝŶĞƚƌŽůůƐ ŝƐŶŽƚŽŶĞŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ?ďƵƚŽŶĞŽĨŚĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚ P “I am 
particularly frustrated with the police and CPS because I stiůů ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĞǇ ŐĞƚ ŝƚ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ
ŵĂŬŝŶŐŝƚĂŚĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚŝƐƐƵĞ ?ŶŽƚĂŵĂůŝĐŝŽƵƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝƐƐƵĞ ? ?49   This is the ethical argument that the 
trolling behaviour is not one of freedom of expression, then, but one of actual assault on a person.  
Where harm occurs is an age-old argument that goes back to Mill, and is one that is constantly 
debated.  The ability for numerous individuals to send individuals synchronous online insults and 
harassing messages is a new problem for that debate, however, as Mill could not have conceived of 
a medium like the Internet.   It is difficult not to accept that Creasy has a point in this regard. 
5. Privacy issues 
Privacy overarches many of the issues related to digital ethics.  The privacy to access and consume 
materials out of the view of others, the privacy to communicate, and go about our daily lives without 
hindrance is something many of us have come to expect.  The reality is that privacy poses significant 
ethical issues within the digital realm. 
5.1. Defining privacy 
Perhaps the most famous definition of privacy was uttered by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
in the case Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928) where he defined privacy as  “dŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽďĞůĞĨƚ
alone ? the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most vaůƵĞĚďǇĂĨƌĞĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?50   In more 
modern times, privacy has been interpreted as a right that we all should be entitled to expect to be 
defended.  For instance, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: 
                                                          
45
 Hume, Mick. Trigger Warning: Is the Fear of Being Offensive Killing Free Speech? (Kindle Locations 1570-
1573). HarperCollins Publishers. Kindle Edition. 
46
 Ibid.   
47
 Oluo, Ijeomoa ? “>ĞƐůŝĞ:ŽŶĞƐ ?dǁŝƚƚĞƌĂďƵƐĞŝƐĂĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŽĨŚĂƚĞ ? ?The Guardian. 19th July 2016.  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/19/leslie-jones-twitter-abuse-deliberate-campaign-
hate   
48
 Twitter troll who targeted Stella Creasy abandons appeal against conviction. The Guardian.  7
th
 May 2015. 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/may/07/twitter-troll-peter-nunn-labour-co-operative-stella-
creasy  
49
 Creasy, S. Police and tech firms are failing to tackle trolling, says Stella Creasy. The Guardian.  Friday 15
th
 
April 2016.  https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/15/online-trolling-not-taken-seriously-
enough-labour-stella-creasy  
50
 American Library Association. Privacy and confidentiality. 
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No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.  
Therefore, privacy is defined as a right that we all should be able to expect to be defended in law. 
However, the right of the individual to privacy is becoming an ever-increasing concern in the 
information society, as information about us can easily be exchanged between parties at the click of 
a mouse, across countries and continents.  It is also extremely difficult to know when and if this 
occurs, and this poses major problems for any legislative body seeking to curb such excesses. 
Of course, as we will see, privacy has also to be balanced against other values.  As with other rights, 
there are trade-offs and competing rights and interests which need to be respected.  Economic 
interests may cause consumers to trade privacy for convenience such as occurs in credit card 
shopping.  Efficient government requires personal information for taxation, health care, and the 
like.  Privacy can also conflict with publicly accepted principles of law enforcement and public safety, 
as it is not desirable for the work of criminals or terrorists to remain private if they break laws and 
threaten wider society. 
It could be argued that privacy is beginning to become a potentially old-fashioned concept.  The 
increasing desire of our governments and the businesses we use to know more about us is impinging 
more on our day-to-day lives.  Registering for many web-based services sees us having to tick boxes 
ƚŽ ƵŶƐƵďƐĐƌŝďĞ ĨƌŽŵ ŵĂŝůŝŶŐƐ Žƌ ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ǁĞ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ŽƵƌ ĚĂƚĂ ƉĂƐƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŽ  “ƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŚŝƌĚ
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ?   /ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂtions increasingly have to spend money on spam and junk mail 
filters to attempt to ensure that their email inbox is not stuffed with inappropriate mails offering 
dubious services.  This is all at the very least an inconvenience, and at the worst offers the potential 
for personal information to be abused or misused.   
5.1.1. Privacy and autonomy 
Privacy is also an important element in the autonomy of the individual.  Much of what makes us 
human comes from our interactions with others within a private sphere where we assume no one is 
observing.   Privacy thus relates to what we say, do, and perhaps even feel.  If we are not able to 
trust that we are in a private space, then we may not be completely autonomous, we may hold back 
crucial elements of ourselves.  AƐ'ƌŝĨĨŝŶŚĂƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ P “ĨƌĂŶŬĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ QŶĞĞĚƐƚŚĞƐŚŝĞůĚŽĨ
privacy; it needs the restraint of peeping Toms and eavesdroppers, of phone taps and bugging 
ĚĞǀŝĐĞƐŝŶŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŚŽƵƐĞ ?ŽĨƚĂŵƉĞƌŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽŶĞ ?ƐŵĂŝůŽƌƐĞŝǌƵƌĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?51 Without 
a right to privacy, then, we are not able to be fully ourselves. Wacks also emphasises this point in 
considering the issue of electronic monitoring oĨ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ P  “ƚŚĞ ƐůŝĚĞ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐ
supervision may fundamentally alter our relationships and our identity. In such a world, employees 
are arguably less likely to execute their duties effectively. If that occurs, the snooping employer will, 
in the eŶĚ ?ƐĞĐƵƌĞƚŚĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞŽĨǁŚĂƚŚĞŚŽƉĞƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ? ?52  /ŶƐƵŵŵĂƌǇ ? “ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ
that our activities are, or even may be, monitored undermines our psychological and emotional 
ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?53 
Yet undoubtedly privacy can pose significant challenges to security.  If an individual is seeking to 
commit a crime or a terrorist act, then arguably privacy affords him more opportunity to do so.    
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 Griffin, J., On Human Rights. 2008: Oxford University Press.  p.225. 
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This is the heart of the tension between a right to privacy and protecting the legitimate interests of 
others, and the state.   
What is important for us to understand in this context is that privacy is a right qualified by other 
interests.  This puts privacy in the same domain as freedom of expression, as other rights can take 
priority over both.  This is a perfectly rational notion since unrestricted privacy could entail 
individuals undertaking activities that potentially damage the interests of others or society in 
general.  It does, however, reveal that there is a tension between what a person might expect in 
terms of privacy and what may be deemed to be encroaching on the rights of others in doing so.  
Whether we recognise it or not, the intricacies of this qualification lie at the heart of the 
controversies we face in our professional practice.  Wacks identifies seven shortcomings of privacy 
that are important to consider: 
1. Privacy is often perceived as an old-ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĞĚǀĂůƵĞ P “ĂŶĂŝƌŽĨŝŶũƵƌĞĚŐĞŶƚŝůŝƚǇ ? 
2. It may conceal genuine oppression, especially of women by men, carried out in the private 
realm of the home. 
3. It may weaken the detection and apprehension of criminals 
4. It may hamper the free flow of information, impeding transparency and candour 
5. It may obstruct business efficiency and increase cost due to the necessity to adhere to 
standards in the collection of personal information 
6. From a communitarian viewpoint, privacy is individualistic and trumps community values 
7. Withholding unflattering personal information constitutes a form of deception. 
54
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states both the right to privacy, and the limits 
that can be placed on it.  Article 8 states that:  ?ǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ŚĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ĨŽƌ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ
family life, ŚŝƐŚŽŵĞĂŶĚŚŝƐĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞ ? ? Section 8 (2) of the ECHR covers the limits that are 
ĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽďĞƉůĂĐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƉƌŝǀĂĐǇƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? P “dŚĞƌĞƐŚĂůůďĞŶŽŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďǇĂ
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ? 
In reality, what does this mean?  Firstly, that any restrictions placed on the right to privacy by states 
must be lawful.  There must be a legal basis for the intrusion, and it must be justified by existing 
legislation.   Framed as they are we can see here a set of restrictions that advocate invasions of 
privacy only in terms designed to protect what are deemed to be the legitimate interests of others, 
whether in the body politic or in their own right.   
5.2. Privacy within the digital realm 
Within the digital realm, privacy confronts us on two fronts, that of governments monitoring our 
behaviour, and that of corporations doing likewise.  In truth the former can be argued to be about 
the protection of the realm, while the latter is about commercial advantage, however, both types of 
surveillance of Internet users raise their own controversies and ethical issues. 
A primary concern for EU legislators relates to the ubiquity of cookies, the small files that download 
ƚŽĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇďƌŽǁƐĞĂǁĞďƐŝƚĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƚƌĂĐŬĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂŶĚĂůůŽǁƚŚĞƵƐĞƌĂ
more enhanced experience.  As much as cookies are essential for e-commerce solutions, they pose 
significant privacy concerns, as they store user activity while they are using websites, but can also 
track behaviour across the web.  In an analogue world this would be the equivalent of a customer 
ǁĂůŬŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŽ DĂƌŬƐ  ? ^ƉĞŶĐĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ĐĂƌĚ ƚŽ ďƵǇ ĂŶ ŝƚĞŵ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŶ ďĞŝŶŐ ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ
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around other stores afterwards by someone who is making notes on their purchases.  This is clearly 
an invasion of privacy and goes against the spirit of data protection in the EU. 
EU Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council has laid down the 
parameters of cookie use across the EU, and compels member countries to address its provisions 
within their own national legislation.   The key element that relates to cookies within the Directive 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƉůĂĐŝŶŐŽĨĐŽŽŬŝĞƐŽŶĂďƌŽǁƐĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ŝƐ  “only allowed on condition that the 
subscriber or user concerned has given his or her consent, having been provided with clear and 
ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?55  The emphasis then is that a 
user must opt-in to receiving a cookie, and in doing so they must have been given access to 
information as to what that cookie will store about them, and why.  In this context, we are dealing 
with the concept of informed consent, which has a history in EU Directives on data protection. 
56
  In 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ƵƐĞƌƐ  “must understand the facts and implications of an action to be able to make 
informed choices, ensuring that they are effectively able to choose freely and voluntarily. 
57
 
dŚŝƐůŝŶŬƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ĐŽŽŬŝĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?ĂƐŝƚŝƐĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇŬŶŽǁŶ ?ďƵŝůĚƐŽŶƉƌĞ-
existing EU Directives related to data privacy, and thus forms the next link in a chain.  Directive 
95/46/EC, is the backbone of data protection legislation throughout Europe and is an important 
component in privacy law, and Directive 2009/136/EC itself was an update to Directive 2002/58/EC 
which first dealt with the issue of cookies amongst other issues related to electronic privacy and 
transmission of data. 
58
  Thus within the EU we can see a natural evolution of data protection law 
that now encompasses the threats to privacy posed by cookies and the tracking of user behaviour in 
the online space.    
5.2.1. Privacy, customised services, and social media 
One of the most contentious areas around privacy online relates to customised services and social 
media and the voluntary surrender of personal privacy necessary on the part of individuals to take 
part in them.   As online security expert, Bruce Schneier obseƌǀĞĚ P  “^ƵƌǀĞŝůůĂŶĐĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĞbusiness 
ŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ QWe build systems that spy on people in exchange for services. Corporations 
call it marketing." 
59
    All of this plays into the larger concept of big data, where enormous databases 
of user data can be mined to predict consumer behaviour for corporate advantage.   The elephant in 
the room, however, is the behaviour of citizens themselves when using online services.   
One of the common paradigms of the modern era is the notion of customisation of services to users.  
In an online environment, the use of cookies for a user could well be a good trade-off with regards 
their privacy if the experience they receive from the website is more tailored to them.  However, this 
tailoring comes at a cost, the loss of part of their privacy.   This is perfectly fine if the informed 
consent concept we discussed earlier is a part of the process; however, research on the awareness 
of cookies amongst the population suggests this is far from the case.   The Information 
Commissioner cites a report conducted in the UK for the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
that raised some significant issues: 
x 41% of respondents were unaware of different types of cookies 
x Only 13% indicated they fully understood how cookies work 
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 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:337:0011:0036:en:PDF  
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 Borghi M, Ferretti F and Karapapa ^ ? “KŶůŝŶĞĚĂƚĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐĐŽŶƐĞŶƚƵŶĚĞƌhůĂǁ PĂƚŚĞŽƌ ƚŝĐĂů
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x 37% had heard of cookies, but did not understand how they work 
x 37% did not know how to manage cookies on their computer 60 
 
We can see then a significant issue with regards the actual issue that is being legislated against.  If 
people do not understand the nature of what they are being protected against, how can the 
legislation be effective? 
From an ethical standpoint, we must also consider here the concept of engineered consent, which in 
contrast to informed consent is built around consent being given because the user essentially has no 
ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ŝĨƚŚĞǇǁŝƐŚƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ?ƐŽƌŐŚŝĞƚĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ? “ŝĨĚĂƚĂƐƵďũĞĐƚƐŚĂǀĞƚŽ
give more information than is strictly necessary to buy goods or access services, then it is likely that 
ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůĐŽŶƐĞŶƚƚŽǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌďƌŽĂĚƵƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĚĂƚĂƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶƚŚĞŐŽŽĚƐŽƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? ?61  If the user 
not accepting cookies on their computer means the service they will receive will be of lesser quality, 
they may trade off in their mind consent for the service versus their privacy.  Such a process has 
arguably coercive elements to it that we must be wary of.  Similar scenarios apply to social media 
and email accounts: is not having them a worse scenario for a citizen than actually having them? 
In terms of social media, how the companies deal with user data is a constant controversy.  One 
example highlights a key issue: in 2007 Facebook launched a new service called Beacon, which 
sought to provide a peer-based advertising system.  Purchases by Facebook members from certain 
third-ƉĂƌƚǇǀĞŶĚŽƌƐǁŽƵůĚƐŚŽǁƵƉŽŶƚŚĞƉĂŐĞƐŽĨĨƌŝĞŶĚƐƚŽĂůĞƌƚƚŚĞŵƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?ƐƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞ ?
This garnered great controversy and was seen by many members as an intrusion into privacy.  It 
does not seem an outlandish concept for someone to wish to keep their purchasing habits secret 
from others, and the Beacon idea raised a significant issue with regards the usage of user data and 
how it can be used to invade privacy.   Ed &ĞůƚĞŶƐƵŵƐƵƉƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇ P “We agree that privacy 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ? ďƵƚ ǁĞ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ Ăůů ĂŐƌĞĞ ŽŶ ŝƚƐ ĐŽŶƚŽƵƌƐ ? /ƚ ?Ɛ ŚĂƌĚ ƚŽ ŽĨĨĞƌ ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞ ƌƵůĞƐ ĨŽƌ recognising a 
privacy problem, but we know one when we see it. Or at least we know it after ǁĞ ?ǀĞƐĞĞŶŝƚ ? ? 62   
Ultimately the Beacon episode is an example of the public recognising a significant privacy problem 
when they saw it, their autonomy being utilised for the commercial gain of another without their 
permission, and they acted to stop it. 
5.2.2. Privacy, government surveillance 
A major controversy with regards to privacy in the digital realm relates to how much power our 
governments should have with regards to monitoring our behaviour.    Governments would argue 
that since the defence of the realm is a crucial aspect of their role, they have a duty to be able to 
investigate when people are using online services, etc to cause us harm.  Such defences can be 
argued to include issues around harassment, cybercrime and fraud, and terrorist offences.  The 
arguments around this, as stated earlier, relate to the limits that should be placed on these 
monitoring activities. 
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In the UK the recent passing of the Investigatory Powers Bill into law has raised significant 
controversies. 
63
   The provisions that raise most controversies relate to: 
x Forcing internet companies to keep user browsing records on users for up to a year 
x Forcing companies to hack into products they have built, such as mobile phones, to enable 
government agencies to monitor them 
The government would argue that such powers better enable them to combat crimes since often 
investigations need to consult records that are old to be able to build a case against perpetrators 
ĂŶĚƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƚŚĞĨƵůůĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞrs argue 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŝŶǀĂƐŝǀĞĂŶĚĂŶĂƐƐĂƵůƚŽŶƚŚĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƉƌŝǀĂĐǇ ? 
The topic of government surveillance has become more controversial in recent years after 
revelations by a former CIA consultant, Edward Snowden, revealed mass surveillance was far more 
widespread in democratic countries than was ever anticipated.  The revelations that the National 
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŐĞŶĐǇ ?E^ ?ǁĞƌĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŶŐ “ǀĂƐƚĂŵŽƵŶƚƐŽĨĚĂƚĂƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĞƚƵƐĞŽĨĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ
ŽŶůŝŶĞ ? ĂůƐŽ ƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚ ƚŚĂt the US government was in collusion with large corporations who also 
collected data on users. 
64
   
While such surveillance raises issues around privacy and trust in government and those who collect 
the data, there is also research from the USA that suggests the knowledge of being potentially 
monitored impacts on freedom of expression, as writers limit what they search for or write about, 
leading to self-censorship. 
65
    Therefore, we see here a classic ethical dilemma over whether the 
utilitarian concern over protecting society as a whole impact on individual rights excessively.   
5.2.3. The right to be forgotten 
In May 2014 a landmark ruling saw the European Court of Justice support the claim of a Spanish 
man, Mario Costeja Gonzalez, to block from Internet searches a 1998 newspaper notice that 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŚŽǁŚŝƐŚŽŵĞǁĂƐƚŽďĞĂƵĐƚŝŽŶĞĚŽĨĨƚŽƉĂǇŽĨĨŚŝƐĚĞďƚƐ ?'ŽŶǌĂůĞǌ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ
this old information was no longer relevant to his life, and in fact hindered him as it was revealed 
prominently in searches about him and this saw others make assumptions about him and his ability 
to manage debt.   On the face of it, this seemed like a straightforward argument, and the idea that 
someone in 2014 should have their life impacted by an out of date aspect of their past seems harsh.  
The ramifications of the judgement, dubbed the right to be forgotten, have been significant, 
however.   
Essentially the ruling meant that anyone could have removed from Internet searches in Europe any 
ŝƚĞŵƚŚĂƚǁĂƐ “ ‘ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ?ŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŽƌŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ? ?66  Critics argued that it would lead to 
famous people or criminals seeking to remove embarrassing aspects of their lives.   Statistics 
accidentally revealed by Google, however, suggested that the vast majority of requests came from 
ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽƌĞŵŽǀĞĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐŝŶŐŽƌŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŝƚĞŵƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵ P “Less than 5% 
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of nearly 220,000 individual requests made to Google to selectively remove links to online 
information concern criminals, politicians and high-ƉƌŽĨŝůĞƉƵďůŝĐĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ? ?67 
Nevertheless, the right to be forgotten raises significant digital ethics questions.  Does the ability to 
ƌĞŵŽǀĞ/ƚĞŵƐĨƌŽŵƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŽĞƐƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƉƌŝǀĂĐǇ
and autonomy for past, and no longer relevant infoƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞŵ ? ƚƌƵŵƉĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ
know that information?   Search engines are relatively new items in terms of our ability to seek out 
information, and since the right to be forgotten does not remove the actual item, only the ability to 
find it, there does seem a grey area here from the point of view of ethics.  As a relatively new ruling, 
it is one that must be watched from the point of view of its impact on society.   
5.2.4. Privacy and library and information services 
A concern for the information profession should be how it handles user data, especially with the 
expansion of services into the cloud, and the use of third-parties to deliver services.  We see such 
scenarios occurring with the development of software as service platforms, where vendors provide 
services like library management system (LMS) access via the cloud, as well as the provision of 
services such as e-book services via vendors.   
Caro and Markman urge librarians to be mindful of LMS security and to regularly test their systems 
for any inadequacies. 
68
  A recent case saw the Miami-Dade Library Service change their e-book 
vendor over concerns over third-party access to and data mining of user data. 
69
   The reality is that 
the more library services use vendors to store user data, the more valuable datasets on user 
behaviour that are created.  Librarians must be aware of the dangers to that data that are 
potentially posed by storing it off site and must reassure themselves of the security of the data and 
that use it will be put to by third parties. 
The Library Freedom project provides information for library and information professionals on how 
to provide more secure services for users and recommendations on software that can be used to 
protect user anonymity online. 
70
  Recommended services include advice on encryption software for 
email services and other online services, as well as advice on how to use secure web services such as 
https as a standard.   
6. Conclusions 
Digital ethics presents us with a range of new challenges based on old values and controversies.   
The arguments around ethical behaviour, freedom of expression, and rights to privacy are not new 
but transplanted into the digital realm present us with brand new challenges to solve. 
The emergence of a new paradigm presented by the Internet, built on an infrastructure and ethos of 
openness and inclusivity, provides many potentially positive opportunities for access to information 
and ideas.  Nevertheless, it also provides opportunities for enhanced surveillance and usage of 
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ĚĂƚĂƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĚĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů ? 
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An understanding of digital ethics from the point of view the services provided by information 
professionals thus necessitates addressing some fundamental ethical theories and applying these to 
the information domain.  We must be cognisant of newly emerging challenges to practice if we are 
to be able to navigate these challenges.  
 
